Because of the rapid worldwide expansion of Chinese exports, particularly to the United States, many people have called for China to revalue the yuan or allow it to float upward against the dollar. But the analysis should not be limited to China. Floating exchange rates are not in the best interests of the ever more closely integrated East Asian economies, most of which are also rapidly accumulating dollar exchange reserves. Nor would a general exchange appreciation of East Asian currencies be a panacea for reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Instead, these countries would be better served by providing certainty for investors and businesses by pegging their currencies to the dollar in the near term, and possibly creating an "Asian Euro" in the longer term.
For month-to-month exchange rate changes, the currencies of the smaller East Asian countries still exhibit more drift against the dollar than before the crisis. However, if Japan could narrow the range of variation of the yen/dollar rate and China succeeds in maintaining its rate at 8.28 yuan/dollar, the pre-crisis dollar pegging of the smaller countries could be fully restored-and macroeconomic stability in East Asia as whole would be greatly enhanced.
The Rise of Intra-East Asian Trade
The rationale for dollar pegging does not primarily arise because of strong trade ties between East Asia and the United States. Table 1 
The Dollar as International Money
More important than direct trade with the United States is the currency of choice for invoicing East Asian trade and capital flows. Although Japan is as important a trading nation in East Asia as is the United States (Table 2) , almost all the intra-regional trade is invoiced in U.S. dollars except when that trade is directly with Japan. Korea is a typical example: 85 percent of Korean exports and about 80 percent of Korean imports are invoiced in dollars-with about 12.4 percent of imports (from Japan) invoiced in yen.
Despite strong trade and investment ties with Japan, yen invoicing is surprisingly small in 
From Debtors to Creditors
In the new millennium, however, East Asian economies are becoming dollar creditors. For two decades or more, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan have run with current account surpluses. China has had a current account surplus since 1995. Formerly crisis economies that have recovered strongly since 1997-98, such as Korea and Thailand, are running large current account surpluses-and are rapidly transforming themselves from being debtors into creditors internationally. However, instead of building up claims on foreigners denominated in their domestic monies, most of the foreign claims-held either privately or as official exchange reserves-are highly liquid dollar assets.
Any international creditor country that cannot lend in its own currency cumulates a currency mismatch that I call the syndrome of conflicted virtue. Countries that are "virtuous" by having a high saving rate (most unlike the United States!) tend to run surpluses in the current account of their international balance of payments, i.e., lend to foreigners. (For empirical estimates of the cumulated stocks of these liquid dollar assets, see Goyal and McKinnon, 2003 , for the case of Japan, and McKinnon and Schnabl, 2003, for the case of China.) But, with the passage of time, two things happen:
(1) As the stock of dollar claims cumulates, domestic holders of dollar assets worry more about a self-sustaining run into the domestic currency forcing an appreciation.
(2) Foreigners start complaining that the country's ongoing flow of trade surpluses is unfair and the result of having an undervalued currency.
Of course (1) and (2) interact. The greater the foreign mercantilist pressure to appreciate the domestic currency, the greater the concern of the domestic holders of dollar assets. As runs into the domestic currency out of dollars begin, the government is "conflicted" because appreciation could induce deflation ending with a zero interest liquidity trap-particularly if the domestic price level was already stable. But foreigners may threaten trade sanctions if the creditor country in question does not allow its currency to appreciate. Whence the syndrome of conflicted virtue.
Unhedged individual or institutional holders of dollar assets are at risk should the domestic currency appreciate. For example, Japanese insurance companies, whose liabilities to annuity holders are in yen but who hold a substantial share of their assets in higher-yield dollar bonds, could be bankrupted should the yen appreciate against the dollar. Thus, as an economy's dollar assets accumulate, their holders become more fearful of a run out of dollars into the domestic currency followed by appreciation. And should the domestic currency actually appreciate when the world price level measured in dollars is itself quite stable, the government worries about the sudden loss of mercantile competitiveness of its exporters followed by a domestic deflationary spiral.
Soft Dollar Pegs
The imperfect solution is for each East Asian government to keep its dollar exchange rate as stable as it can. This then reduces risk seen either by unhedged dollar debtors or by unhedged dollar creditors within the economy in question. Hence the resort to the soft, or informal, dollar pegging we observe in non-crisis periods.
To be sure, some governments would like to give full assurance that the domestic exchange rate is never going to change. But no one government dares to commit itself to an absolutely fixed exchange rate when its neighbors, who are close trading partners, have not done so. The spillover effects from other countries changing their exchange rates are just too great for any country to risk becoming completely inflexible in responding. (Argentina's problems in the late 1990s arose when Brazil and Chile allowed large depreciations of their currencies.) So, short of adopting a full-fledged system of regional dollar parities-a difficult exercise in collective action although a potentially great public good for East Asia-soft pegging is the result. 
